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Abstract
Invalid input often leads to unexpected behavior in a program and is behind a
plethora of known and unknown vulnerabilities. To prevent improper input from
being processed, the input needs to be validated before the rest of the program
executes. Formal language theory facilitates the definition and recognition of
proper inputs.
We focus on the problem of defining valid input after the program has already
been written. We construct a parser that infers the structure of inputs which avoid
vulnerabilities while existing work focuses on inferring the structure of input the
program anticipates. We present a tool that constructs an input language, given the
program as input, using symbolic execution on symbolic arguments. This differs
from existing work which tracks the execution of concrete inputs to infer a grammar.
We test our tool on programs with known vulnerabilities, including programs in
the GNU Coreutils library, and we demonstrate how the parser catches known
invalid inputs.
We conclude that the synthesis of the complete parser cannot be entirely automated due to limitations of symbolic execution tools and issues of computability.
A more comprehensive parser must additionally be informed by examples and
counterexamples of the input language.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Section 1.1

Problem
Every computer program accepts a set of inputs and then returns a set of outputs.
However, not every program has specified exactly what format of inputs it expects.
Maliciously crafted input can cause the program to execute unexpectedly and lead
to unintended consequences. It may cause the application to perform unauthorized actions like expose sensitive information or execute system commands. One
such example is the Heartbleed attack, a bug in the OpenSSL implementation of the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols, designed
to secure communications on a computer network [14]. It consists of a crafted
heartbeat message, or a message to demonstrate responsiveness between two connected computers. In a heartbeat message exchange as intended, one computer
sends a signal to the other, indicating the size of the message and expects the other
computer to simply send the message back. Without verification of the contents
of this message, specifically that the message actually consists of the number of
bits that it claims, one computer can trick the computer into divulging additional
1
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(b) The program receives unexpected input

(a) The program receives expected input

Figure 1.1: The program will exhibit unpredictable behavior if it is given input it
does not expect
information, like recently entered usernames and passwords.
The Heartbleed attack is only one example. The issue of input validation is
rampant. A simple search for “input validation” on Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE), on May 16, 2020, reveals 1379 results, and “buffer overflow”, a
common form of improper input, reveals over ten thousand entries. Cyberattacks
exploit vulnerabilities in programs that fail to parse and validate input, necessitating a stringent form of input validation.
As shown in Figure 1.1, the universe of possible input may differ from the input
that program is designed to accept and operate on. Proper input validation relies
on defining the accepted set of inputs and then developing a parser that accepts
only this exact set.
1.1.1. Thesis Summary
This thesis aims to automatically generate a grammar that defends against detected vulnerabilities by only consuming the program as input. The grammar will
be implemented as a parser modeling the same structure. The parser will then be
prepended to the program to only allow valid input to execute through the program. Valid input is defined as strings within the formal language specified by the

2
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grammar, and these inputs should not trigger known or detected vulnerabilities.
The details of what a grammar entails first calls for a discussion of the underlying
approach to handling input as a formal language in language-theoretic security.

Section 1.2

Background
1.2.1. Language-theoretic Security (LangSec)
Programmers are advised not to trust input data, but these terms are ambiguous.
Parsers are the first line of defense with validating input to ensure that preconditions are met before executing the code. Parsers break the input into conveniently
packaged elements, which the rest of the code processes. However, they often fall
victim to improperly checking preconditions assumed by the rest of the code and
receiving unexpected input, leading to unpredictable behavior like buffer overflows or memory corruption. Often times a series of if statements check the input
and fail to completely validate a program’s assumptions about the input. In addition, it is difficult to verify whether the input handling correctly accepts or rejects
valid and invalid input. For complex enough input formats, this is computationally
undecidable. Without strict guidelines of what a valid input entails, developers are
more likely to skimp on checking whether or not the data conforms to expectation.
Language-theoretic security is based on applying formal language theory to
define input to secure communication with a program. A formal language is
defined as the set of strings over a finite alphabet. A grammar characterizes a
language with a set of rules that decides which strings, formed by elements in the
alphabet, are part of the language and which are not. The size of a language can
be, and often is, infinite.
The premise of language-theoretic security states that input handling should
3
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treat the set of all valid inputs as a formal language and construct a parser that
recognizes this language [25]. A proper program must recognize input correctly,
so each program implicitly has a set of expected inputs. LangSec declares that this
set of inputs needs to be made explicit in a computational-theoretic and formal
language-theoretic approach by detailing a grammar to describe it. In addition, the
grammar needs to be as simple as possible with simplicity described by its position
in the Chomsky hierarchy [17, 26]. The complexity of languages ranges from
regular expressions to Turing-recognizable languages, each requiring increasingly
complicated machines to recognize strings in the language.
Momot et. al [23] details the standard process to input processing and protocol
design. First, define the set of acceptable inputs to a program via a grammar or formal language, ensuring the grammar is as simple as possible on the Chomsky scale
of syntactic complexity. Second, construct a parser plainly following this grammar.
Finally, establish a clear boundary between input validation and processing by
only processing the input after it is validated by the parser. Invalid input should
be rejected immediately and never processed in the first place. This will protect
against shotgun parser bugs like Heartbleed and Android Master Keys bug, where
input validation is mixed with processing code.
The implementation of the grammar must derive and resemble the grammar
itself. Parser combinator toolkits, like Hammer [23], facilitate the design of this
parser. Parser combinators combine individual parsers to output a new parser.
Parser combinators consist of primitives and combinators. Primitives specify the
basic unit of a token to be parsed like end of line tokens, strings, integers and
individual character tokens in a range, as shown in Table 1.1. Combinators combine
these tokens to compose parsers like in sequence or repetition, as shown in Table
1.2. Hammer’s combinators resemble grammar combinators like concatenation and
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Syntax

Usage

Description

h ch

h ch(‘a’)

Matches a single specified character
token

h ch range h ch range(‘a’, ‘z’)

Matches a single token in the specified
character range

h token

h token("hello", 5)

Matches the specified string of given
length

h int64

h int64()

Matches a signed 8-byte integer

h end p

h end p()

Matches the end of the parser input

Table 1.1: Hammer parser primitives

Kleene star, so the grammar is easily recognizable from the parser implementation.
The syntax of Hammer parsers is also easy to interpret.
Figure 1.2 depicts the series of events involved in validating input with LangSec.
The construction of a LangSec parser first requires defining the grammar. Ideally
the definition of this grammar occurs in the writing of the program, but existing
legacy code would also benefit from proper input handling. The grammar is then
implemented via a parser combinator library like Hammer. Every input must first
go through the parser and only valid, accepted input continues to be executed by
the program. Invalid input should be immediately rejected by the parser and never
be processed by the program.
The parsing of input currently requires manual intervention to construct the
grammar. Unless the developer has a formal and written out a grammar a priori,
extracting the formal language of a data format from a written program or data
examples is a very hands-on process. Programs often do not have a detailed specification of expected input and rely on parsing scattered throughout the program.
5
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Syntax

Usage

Description

h choice

h choice(h ch(‘a’),
h ch(‘b’), NULL)

Performs the Boolean “or” operation

h sequence

h sequence(h ch(‘a’),
h ch(‘b’), NULL)

Performs the concatenation operation

h repeat n

h repeat n(h ch(‘a’,
5))

Repeats given parser n times

h many

h many(h ch(‘a’))

Performs the Kleene star operation for
0 or more repetitions

h many1

h many1(h ch(‘a’))

Performs the + operation for 1 or more
repetitions

h optional

h optional(h ch(‘a’))

Performs the ? operation to match 0
or 1 occurrences

Table 1.2: Hammer parser combinators
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(a) The parser accepts expected input

(b) The parser rejects unexpected input

Figure 1.2: The parser implements the grammar. The language the parser accepts
should be equivalent to the language the program expects. If the parser rejects an
input, the program never processes it.
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The goal of this thesis is to computationally automate this process by taking a
program as input and outputting a grammar.
Language-theoretic security establishes validating input as central to any design
process. By restricting the complexity of the input language, it is possible to design
parsers with formally verifiable properties. However, many existing programs,
especially those designed without security in mind, lack a robust input handling
procedure. LangSec starts with defining a grammar of the input language, but for
such legacy programs, the grammar is neither explicit nor clearly extractable. I set
out to automatically derive a formal language parser for the input by just looking at
the program and employing the tool of symbolic execution to follow its execution
pattern.
1.2.2. Symbolic Execution
The ultimate goal of a testing technique is to detect or rule out vulnerabilities in
a program. One approach would be to test the program using distinct, random
inputs, but there is no guarantee these inputs will trigger a vulnerability if one
exists. Symbolic execution provides a more comprehensive approach that explores
many execution paths at the same time and checks if each path is exploitable.
Symbolic execution is a software testing technique that executes a program on
symbolic input, which is input that’s allowed to be anything [9]. Static analysis
tools attempt to find problems before they happen without running the code, but
they often require an expert in static analysis to distinguish false positives and real
bugs. On top of that, executing a piece of code helps identify certain classes of
errors such as functional correctness. Symbolic execution is easy to use as a bug
finding tool. It evaluates the program on symbolic input values, as opposed to
concrete values. When the program reaches a branch in execution, it first checks
the feasibility of each of the branches, then duplicates the state and traverses each
8
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of the branches separately. It accumulates constraints for the input that follows
the specified path. Once the path terminates or finds a bug, it uses an automated
theorem prover to provide a concrete value that satisfies these constraints. The
concept can be clarified with an example, shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4.
Figure 1.3: Symbolic Execution Sample Program
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

int foofum(int x, int y) {
int z = x + y;
assert(z != 0);
if (z <= 10) {
return z / y;
}
return z;
}

Figure 1.4: Execution tree for example in Figure 1.3 formed by branching the path
at each dangerous operation. The constraints generated and the order of traversal
may differ based on the symbolic execution tool used.
We walk through the code and tree step by step. The program is executed with
two symbolic values, x and y, meaning their values can be anything. π maintains
9
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the constraints that lead up the state. In the beginning, there are no constraints, so π
evaluates to true. The code branches at any potentially dangerous operation. Line
2 forms z by adding the two symbolic values. For the assert statement on Line 3, the
symbolic executor will solve the current constraints to see if there exists a value that
evaluates the assert expression to false. If there is, it terminates with an error and
details both the path condition and an example of an input that triggers it. It also
branches for when the assert statement returns true. Similarly, the path branches
for the if statement in Line 4. If this statement evaluates to false, the program
immediately ends. Otherwise, the division of z and y in Line 5 is a dangerous
operation because at this point, the path condition has not forbidden y from being
zero. The path branches and every path terminates. When a path terminates, a
solver solves the constraints to produce a concrete example that followed the path.
We use the open source symbolic execution library klee, an industrial-grade
symbolic execution library for C code that runs on LLVM bitcode [5]. klee has been
used to detect bugs in version 6.10 of the gnu coreutils library as well as busybox
and minix [9].
Although symbolic execution intelligently executes code to perform an exhaustive search of possible input, it falls victim to a few limitations. Introduced in
the 70s [19], symbolic execution has become more feasible due to better theorem
provers (SAT/SMT solvers), more computational power, and heuristics to control
the exponential explosion of paths. Symbolic execution shows promising coverage
in research, but in practice, it is difficult to consistently achieve high coverage.
Common concerns include the exponential explosion of the number of paths, the
limitations of constraint solvers, and the difficulty with modeling the environment
in which the code is run like system or library calls. However, symbolic execution
is still a useful testing tool for many programs.

10
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As shown by Cadar et al [9], klee achieves high code coverage on a diverse
set of real, complicated programs. The ability to create symbolic files models the
file system of the environment. While these results may be difficult to generalize
to all programs, the experiments of klee demonstrate the potential of symbolic
execution.
klee’s goals are to (a) Reach every line of executable code and (b) Detect at
each dangerous operation (e.g., deference, assertion) if any input value exists that
could cause an error [9]. It makes this feasible through several optimizations like
compact state representation, query optimization and state scheduling. Assuming
these two goals are met, we aim to achieve complete coverage of inputs that may
trigger vulnerabilities.
The klee constraint language is KQuery, described in the KQuery documentation. The constraints capture the meaning of the π or path condition, as exemplified
in Figure 1.4. Running klee on the simple example gave four paths, with constraints
exactly as described. For the constraints in Line 5, we observe that we can perform
several optimizations, which klee enacts. For example, it simplifies the path of the
left box in Line 5 with the knowledge that β = 0:

((α + β) , 0) ∧ ((α + β) ≤ 10) ∧ (β = 0)
becomes
(α , 0) ∧ (β = 0) ∧ (α ≤ 10)
This is an example of the query optimization that klee performs.
We will use symbolic execution to generate constraints that lead to vulnerabilities. We will then construct a parser out of these constraints. In the simple example,
this parser would reject all input where β = 0 and when α + β = 0. Naturally, the
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parser is predicated on the symbolic executor’s ability to detect dangerous operations. If it is unable to detect a vulnerability that we are aware of, we can add
an assert statement that evaluates to false for the given vulnerability so that klee
generate those constraints.

Section 1.3

Proposed Solution
LangSec asserts that security is only guaranteed when input is validated as a formal language. LangSec highlights the importance of designing a simple input
language for protocols and programs in general, which leads to a parser implementation of this grammar. However, while these principles facilitate the design of
new applications and protocols, we want to apply LangSec’s principles to existing
programs.
We set out to automatically construct this grammar from the program itself by
using symbolic execution. The grammar defines inputs that do not trigger certain
vulnerabilities. We are limited to the bugs that symbolic execution can find or that
has already been reported, so we focus on constructing a grammar that rejects input
that triggers those specific vulnerabilities. The goal is to take a program as input,
and output a parser that protects against detected or known vulnerabilities. This
parser then gets prepended to the program and rejects any invalid input, which is
then never executed in the program.

12
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Section 1.4

Related Work
I examine other works related to extracting an input format from the program itself
and point out their shortcomings.
1.4.1. Reverse Engineering Protocols
Most of the literature around inferring an input format centers around reversing
message formats for protocols. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work
integrates formal language theory and symbolic execution. A section of literature
focuses on the automatic extraction of the protocol message format without access
to the protocol specification [7, 8, 11, 12]. The message format consists of sequences
of fields organized with certain rules of what values each field can take within a
fixed domain. Caballero et. al [8] looks at program binaries. Cui et. al and Caballero
et. al observe execution and network traces to extract the message format and
field semantics [7, 11, 12]. These papers focus on a subset of the general problem
for extracting the input format for a protocol rather than an arbitrary program.
Protocols introduce a different challenge because depending on its position in the
protocol state machine, different message formats will be expected. None of the
aforementioned papers address how they would extract this protocol state machine.
To be able to extract the protocol message format, we need two languages: one for
the protocol messages and another for the protocol state machine. Antunes et. al
attempts to reconstruct both languages from the network traces [4]. We focus on
a different problem, not specific to protocol design, so there implicitly is a single
state for the program.

13

1.4 Related Work

Introduction

1.4.2. Learning Languages from Examples
The more theoretical side of related work focuses on deriving a formal grammar.
In [15], Gold established the limitations of learning a language from examples
in the language. By simply presenting positive examples, Gold concluded that
infinite regular languages are not learnable. This result can be extended to more
complex languages. Angluin demonstrated that an infinite regular language can
be constructed from examples and counterexamples [3]. A counterexample is a
string that belongs in the conjectured set but not in the correct set. This result
depends on having a teacher that can answer membership queries of whether or
not a string belongs in the language. The teacher must also say yes if the conjectured
language is equal to the desired language and provide a counterexample otherwise.
The method of learning based on examples and counterexamples is difficult to
implement in practice because such a teacher/oracle does not exist that can assert
when the conjectured language is equal to the desired language.
1.4.3. Synthesize Input Grammar from Execution
Finally, we look at more recent work to engineer an input grammar based on the
principles of LangSec. In [13], Curley uses machine learning on a dataset of URIs
from an Apache HTTP access log to extract a context free grammar. Curley demonstrates where theory differs from practice by using a recurrent neural network to
both predict the response codes and generate strings in the language. Curley concludes that while it may be impossible to prove that all context free languages can
be learned from examples and counterexamples, certain languages in this set can be
learned with high accuracy. However, most programs lack an elaborate database
of tagged strings, and it is unreasonable to train a deep learning model for every
input language. Although the model implicitly recognizes the grammar, there is
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no way to extract the grammar out to prove its accuracy.
Bastani et. al designed GLADE, which [6] builds a context free grammar from
a set of input examples and blackbox access to the program. Starting with inputs,
GLADE constructs an increasingly general language based on repetition, alternation and recursive constructs to the language. However, it does not take advantage
of the program’s structure and does not detail how to recover the readable grammar.
Autogram [18] mines context free input grammars by observing how an input is
processed in a program and tags each piece of stored data with the input fragment
it comes from. It then outputs the grammar in Backus normal form. It achieves
100% coverage of the language in many cases like with Apache Commons CSV
and JSON Objects by analyzing the Minimal JSON library. To perform dynamic
analysis, Autogram begins with a set of inputs that belong to the grammar, which
may or may not be feasible depending on whether a training set or reference
grammar exists. On top of that, it runs on parsers for commonly used file formats
rather than an arbitrary piece of code. Its goal is to capture and formally define
the parser’s grammar while our goal is to output a grammar that protects against
certain vulnerabilities.
Autogram and mimid [16, 18] form the literature of constructing a human readable context free grammar from input. mimid improves upon Autogram’s dynamic analysis by inserting trackers in the source program at conditions, loops,
and method entries and exits. These trackers follow input character accesses being
made to determine which method calls should be associated with the particular
character index, regardless of whether these characters are stored. In contrast,
Autogram operates on the data flow of stored variables. mimid constructs a parser
tree, which generalizes to grammars, from methods accessing some part of the in-
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put. Mera also uses taint analysis to further refine automatically generated context
free grammars to express semantic relationships between grammar elements [22].
For example a context free grammar can specify that the field maxsum is an integer,
but the value of maxsum may restrict the values of other fields of integers.
Among these different tools to infer input grammars, this thesis addresses the
dissimilar but related problem of inferring a grammar that protects against detected
vulnerabilities. Our work also analyzes inputs to all programs, not just programs
that are parsers. While further analysis of their outputted grammar may lead to
insight about possible exploits, we focus directly on the problem of preventing
these exploits. Instead of returning just the grammar, we return a parser which
implements the grammar.

Section 1.5

Overview
I set out to automatically infer an input grammar from a program. The grammar and its parser implementation only accept inputs that do not trigger certain
vulnerabilities.
I will first detail the method of deriving the grammar and parser from the
symbolic execution constraints in Chapter 2. Then, I apply these methods on a
collection of code samples, including the heavily tested GNU Coreutils library in
which klee detected undiscovered bugs in Chapter 3. Our tool generates parsers
for each symbolic input. Chapter 4 discuses the limitations of our tool and future
work to address these limitations as well as other directions to take to advance the
tool. Finally, in Chapter 5, we summarize contributions made and the practicality
of our tool.
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Chapter 2

Methods
In this section, we first provide an overview of the architecture, then describe the
main steps in more detail.
The goal of this paper is to automatically generate a parser combinator implementation of the input grammar that protects against certain vulnerabilities. To do
this, we use symbolic execution.
Figure 2.1 provides a visual overview of the steps used to generate the parser.
The sections highlighted in orange denote my own contributions. klee takes the
LLVM bitcode of the program and symbolically executes the file with the symbolic
arguments provided. The user must specify the size, number, and type of symbolic
inputs. If the user knows of an input that triggers the vulnerability, they can model
the symbolic arguments based on this input. The klee-stats tool provides the line
coverage of an execution of klee on provided symbolic inputs. If the line coverage
is not satisfactory, the user can allocate more symbolic arguments, increase their
sizes or allocate different types of arguments. Then, they run klee with these
new parameters, and repeat the process of checking line coverage and rerunning
if necessary. Finding the proper allocation of symbolic arguments is an iterative
process that can be sped up with knowledge of what inputs can trigger different
17
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Figure 2.1: The envisioned overview of how we automatically generate the grammar. The bold arrows represent necessary inputs or libraries. The standard arrows
represent conditional splits.
behaviors in the program.
klee detects errors such as pointer, free, abort, assert or division errors at dangerous operations. For every error that klee detects, it generates the constraints
that led to the error. We use klee’s constraint parser to parse the constraint written in the .kquery file into an Abstract Syntax Tree. The KQuery documentation
elaborates the KQuery format, as noted in Section 1.2.2. We then traverse this tree
to generate a parser that invokes the Hammer library parser combinators. If klee
does not detect a known vulnerability, we place an assert statement that evaluates
to false in the path that triggered the error, so that klee identifies it as an assert error.
We then run klee on the updated program with the additional assert statement.
An assert false statement can be inserted in a section of code that should not run,
and klee will determine the constraints that lead to that section. We traverse the
constraints to generate a parser. The final output is a .c file with the implementation
of the parser for each symbolic argument.
18
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Figure 2.2: Sample buffer overflow vulnerability
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

int main(void) {
char buff[4];
printf("\n Enter the password : \n");
gets(buff);
...
return 0;
}

Throughout this section, we demonstrate the architecture with a simple example
of a buffer overflow in the gets C function, shown in Figure 2.2. The C file consists
of this main function and is called password.c. The ... represents code that
compares the inputted string with the actual password and grants access if it is
correct. The gets function is known to be unsafe because it does not verify if
the input can fit inside the buffer. A buffer overflow will affect the later code
that validates the input and lead to unexpected behavior like potentially granting
disallowed access.

Section 2.1

Running KLEE
To run klee on a program, we must first extract its LLVM bitcode by either compiling
it to emit LLVM or extract-bc from the executable.
Then, we run klee with symbolic inputs. klee allows specifying symbolic
arguments, files, stdin and stdout as well as their size. We illustrate examples with
different types of symbolic arguments later. For the gets example, we first extract
the bitcode from the file with
clang -emit-llvm -g -c password.c -o password.bc
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We then run klee on this bitcode file with a symbolic stdin, meaning the stdin
can take any value. We make the stdin symbolic because our code takes input from
standard input, and we limit it to an arbitrary 100 characters.
klee --libc=uclibc --posix-runtime password.bc -sym-stdin 100
uclibc provides definitions for all the external functions the program may call,
and the command tells klee to load that library and link it with the application
before it starts execution. posix-runtime works with klee and the uclibc library
to provide the majority of the operating system facilities used by command line
applications like write. Without these libraries, klee is unaware of what the gets
function does.
For other programs, we similarly specify the symbolic arguments for which we
want to generate parsers when running klee.
If klee detects an error while running, it creates a test file for that error and
continues running on other constraints. For programs with known vulnerabilities
that klee does not detect as an error, add an assert statement that evaluates to false
at the known error and run klee again. Running klee on a known invalid input
without any symbolic arguments generates an error file that reveals the line the
error is thrown. To make sure this error is not a false positive, we may replay the
input that triggered the error with klee-replay. False positives are theoretically
impossible because the input follows the same path as klee in the unmodified
program. However, non-determinism, bugs and heuristics used in klee may lead
to such errors [9]. The syntax of klee-replay operates on the generated .ktest file.
The ktest file contains the result of applying a constraint solver to output an input
that satisfies these constraints. Here is an example of running klee-replay:
klee-replay ./password ./klee-out-1/test000011.ktest

20

2.2 Parsing Constraints

Methods

Figure 2.3: Constraint for pointer error in gets
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array stdin[100] : w32 -> w8 = symbolic
(query [(Eq false
(Eq 10
(Extract w8 0 (ZExt w32 (Read
(Eq false
(Eq 10
(Extract w8 0 (ZExt w32 (Read
(Eq false
(Eq 10
(Extract w8 0 (ZExt w32 (Read
(Eq false
(Eq 10
(Extract w8 0 (ZExt w32 (Read
false [] [stdin])

w8 0 stdin)))))

w8 1 stdin)))))

w8 2 stdin)))))

w8 3 stdin)))))]

For our example, klee generates 11 paths and tests, the last of which led to a
pointer error. In the next section, we look at the constraints for this path.

Section 2.2

Parsing Constraints
After running klee, we look at the constraints that trigger certain errors. klee
generally solves these constraints to identify an example for every possible path,
but we want to capture the complete language of the constraints, not just one
example. These constraints are textually represented in KQuery format, designed
to be compact and easy to read and write. We walk through the constraint that
generated the pointer error in our example as shown in Figure 2.3. We removed
parts of the constraint that are not relevant to the stdin symbolic argument.
Each line in the constraint is either an array declaration (Line 1) or a query
command (other lines). A query command is run by the constraint solver and
is denoted by the keyword “query”. The important parts of this query are the
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constraint list and then the last element. We manually added [] [stdin] after the
last false to specify that we want to generate a parser for this specific symbolic
input (stdin).
The first line in Figure 2.3 declares stdin to be a symbolic buffer of size 100 storing
1 byte elements. The second line denotes a query and the start of a constraint list.
Each line of the constraint is very similar, so we look at one line.
(Eq false (Eq 10 (Extract w8 0 (ZExt w32 (Read w8 0 stdin)))))
We start with the most interior layer of Read w8 0 stdin. This reads the 0th
index of the symbolic array of size 8 bits. ZExt evaluates the lowest 32 bits of this
value. Extract extracts 8 bits from this value starting from bit 0. After ZExt and
Extract, the value is the same as the original 8 bits read. Then, the constraint
declares that this values should not be equal to 10. This is repeated for each indices
1, 2 and 3.
The vulnerability was that we only allocated a buffer of size 4, but allowed
arrays larger than size 4 to be written to it which may lead to a buffer overflow.
gets stops reading at a newline character or when the end-of-file (EOF) is reached.
If none of the first 4 characters are newline characters or EOF, we get a buffer
overflow. This is indicated by our constraints. Index 0 to 3 must exist, so they are
not EOF, and they are not the newline character, leading to an error.
Since klee’s constraint solver operates on this KQuery language, the klee toolset
already has a parser that consumes the constraint language and outputs an Abstract
Syntax Tree (AST). Our tool then parses this tree to construct a Hammer parser that
accepts the constraint language. Although we write the parser to accept inputs
that give us an error, we can flip the logic to reject input that it parses successfully
and accept input that it fails to parse. This flip is only provably computationally
feasible if the language is within deterministic context free languages, so our parser
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is limited to these languages.
We observe that klee operates on its symbolic input as an array of characters,
and we take advantage of this format in designing the parser. We introduce a data
structure that we call SetCombinator to store an intermediate representation of the
constraints that then gets translated to Hammer invocations.
We set up the parser character by character and restrict the values each character
can be. A SetCombinator is organized as an array of sets where each set represents
the set of allowed characters from 0 to 127, the range of ASCII values. The unit
size of an element of klee’s arrays is always 8 bits. Representations of more
bits are formed by concatenating multiple elements in the array. The size of the
SetCombinator depends on the size of the symbolic input. Every time an index is
Read from the symbolic array and certain constraints are applied, the respective
index in the SetCombinator also updates its set to accommodate these constraints.
The final set left at each index represents the intersection of every constraint applied
to the index.
Going back to our gets example, we first initialize each set in our SetCombinator of size 100 with a complete set of {0, 127}. The process of constructing the
SetCombinator is depicted in Figure 2.4. As we parse each constraint in the AST,
we exclude 10 from the sets at index 0 to 3. We use U = {0, 1, ..., 127} to denote the
universe of values for each element in the array. The resulting SetCombinator looks
like Table 2.1. Each index of our SetCombinator corresponds with the index in the
symbolic array. We have restricted the first 4 indices to not included the newline
character, encoded with ASCII value 10, and there are no restrictions on the other
indices.
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Figure 2.4: Steps to construct the SetCombinator for the gets example constraints.
The SetCombinator representation is then turned into a parser implementation.
0

1

2

3

4

5

...

100

{0,9} ∪{11, 127}

{0,9} ∪{11, 127}

{0,9} ∪{11, 127}

{0,9} ∪{11, 127}

U

U

...

U

Table 2.1: SetCombinator Example

Section 2.3

Outputting Hammer Invocations
Once we have the SetCombinator filled out from the constraints, we can translate
it to Hammer invocations. The Hammer parser will ultimately be a sequence of
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elements where each element will represent the range of values the character is
allowed to take. The parser will take strings as input, or sequences of characters.
Each index in the SetCombinator represents a range of possible ASCII character
values. This can be captured with the h option and h ch range or h ch Hammer
invocations, as described in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. These characters are then concatenated in an h sequence or left as is if there is only one element in the sequence.
Running our algorithm on the KQuery file from the example, we get the parser
h repeat n(h choice(h ch range(0,9), h ch range(11,127), NULL), 4)
Note that our algorithm will simplify repetitive indices by employing h repeat n
and cut off the rest of the SetCombinator if there are no further restrictions on the
later indices. If there are restrictions for every index, we end our parser with
h end p to indicate that the parsed string should end there and makes sure that
there is no input left to parse. Our parser stops at index 4 because the first 4 indices
are the only characters whose values lead to the buffer overflow. The first 4 indices
either belong in the character range 0 to 9 or 11 to 127, only excluding 10 from its
range.
The actual output of this parser is a .c file which implements this parser in the
main function. It parses stdin, but this can be modified to parse passed arguments
as well. We chose to output the parser textually rather than by reference to allow
the user to identify what makes up the parser and customize it as necessary.
The final step comes with compiling this Hammer implementation and attaching the parser to the start of the program as shown in Figure 2.5. The logic is a
little reversed because the parser accepts inputs that would throw an error, so we
negate the results. Inputs that trigger the error are blocked by the parser and never
passed to the rest of the program.
We tested our parser on a few examples that would overflow the gets buffer and
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Figure 2.5: Prepending the parser to the program, so that the program never runs
on invalid input
those that would not. It successfully rejects and accepts these inputs. This is not
a complete testing method, but upon observation and knowledge of the behavior
of gets, we can observe that the parser recognizes strings that overflow the finite
buffer.

Section 2.4

Code and Documentation
The code was implemented as an additional option in the klee library, similarly
to its tools like kleaver, which is their constraint solver and klee-replay, which
replays generated test inputs. It currently consists of 921 lines of additional code.
It is available on github.
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Experiments
Upon running the experiments, we adjust our architecture diagram to reflect limitations in purely generating parsers from the constraints, as indicated in Figure 3.1.
The main difference lies after generating the parser combinator. Due to limitations
in symbolic execution, the grammar often does not provide a notion of all the inputs
that trigger the known errors. The parser needs to be manually configured after
testing a series of examples and counterexamples based on the current grammar
and observing the program’s execution. After updating the parser and grammar,
we repeatedly test examples and counterexamples until reaching a grammar that
logically triggers all known errors. Knowledge of the program behavior would
advise this manual testing process.
The ultimate goal is to reject inputs the trigger certain vulnerabilities. We
first generate our parser to accept the language of invalid inputs, as described
by the constraints. To reject invalid inputs, we negate the results of our parser.
The complement of our languages is computable because our parser implements
deterministic context free languages.
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Figure 3.1: The overview of how we automatically generate the grammar, in practice. Orange represents our contributions. The bold arrows represent necessary
inputs or libraries. The standard arrows represent conditional splits.
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Section 3.1

GNU Coreutils 6.10
In its inaugural paper, klee reported detecting 10 errors in the GNU Coreutils
6.10 library. The GNU Coreutils library implements basic tools used in Unix-like
operating systems such as ls and cat [2]. We run the same version on a 64-bit
Ubuntu 18.04.4 Desktop. The paper ran the programs on a 32-bit machine, so
the constraints generated on our machine are often more complex and memory
intensive. We generate constraints for 5 of the 10 errors. Out of the other 5, we
were only able to reproduce the error on the given input for 3 of the programs, but
were unable to generate constraints for these errors. The length of the symbolic
input for two of these three programs were over 26 characters, and running this
exceeded the max run time allocated. For the past program, we were unable to
reproduce an error on klee.
We reproduce in Table 3.1 the inputs that cause program crashes from [9], and
we generate a parser that catches these inputs. Again, we only look at the set of 5
programs for which we were able to 1) reproduce the error by crashing the program
on a known malformed input and 2) run klee to detect an error and thus output
the constraints that triggered the error.
We ran klee with varying numbers and sizes of symbolic arguments. Because
we had the additional insight of an example of an input that triggers the vulnerability, we modeled the symbolic input to follow that format.
We walk through the example of mkdir. Although we used several additional
options like running it in a sandbox directory and maxing out the time the run
took, we highlight the key options used with running klee. First, we run klee with
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mkdir -Z a b
mkfifo -Z a b
mknod -Z a b p
md5sum -c t1.txt
seq -f %0 1
t1.txt: “\t \tMD5(”

Table 3.1: A subset of the inputs that cause vulnerabilities in GNU Coreutils
6.10 [9]. This subset reflects the programs for which we were able to generate
constraints that triggered errors. When replaying the values from solving the
constraints, the values crashed the program.

klee --optimize --libc=uclibc --posix-runtime ./mkdir.bc
--sym-arg 2 --sym-arg 1 --sym-arg 1
The --libc=uclibc and --posix-runtime tags are the same as described in
Section 2.1. The option --optimize optimizes mkdir program’s code before execution. The --sym-arg options create three symbolic arguments, with the first
one being 2 characters long, followed by one character and another character. After running klee, the .kquery file only detailed constraints for the 0th arguments
(arg00) and the 2nd argument (arg02), implicitly implying the existence of a 1st
argument with no constraints. We add [] and [arg00 arg01 arg02] to the last line
before the parentheses, just as in Figure 2.2, to denote that we want parsers for our
symbolic inputs arg00, arg01 and arg02. The [] tells us there are no additional
constraints on these arguments. Our tool outputs three different parsers for each
of the symbolic arguments as shown in Table 3.2.
We rewrite the results in Table 3.2 by substituting the ASCII decimal values
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arg00

h sequence(h ch(45), h ch(90), NULL)

arg01

h ch range(0, 127)

arg02

h choice(h ch range(0, 44), h ch range(46, 127), NULL)

Table 3.2: Hammer invocations automatically output by our tool to parse each of the
symbolic arguments. Arguments are numbered from 0 to 2. Table 3.3 captures this
table except it substitutes the ASCII values with ASCII characters, and introduces
additional notation.

arg00

h sequence(h ch(‘-’), h ch(‘Z’), NULL)

arg01

h ch range(0, 127)

arg02

h not ch(‘-’)

Table 3.3: Substituting Table 3.2 parser ASCII character values with actual characters. The first symbolic argument must be -Z, followed by a nonempty argument,
followed by an argument that is not -.

with their respective characters to facilitate our interpretation in Table 3.3. We
also introduce the notation h not ch(45) to denote h choice(h ch range(0, 44),
h ch range(46, 127), NULL) for ease of interpretation. h not ch(45) is not a
valid Hammer function and is just used for notation. Often, character ranges just
exclude one character, and this representation is more informative. To translate
the parsers to English, we see that the first argument must be -Z followed by a
nonempty argument and a third argument with cannot be -. The input -Z a b that
crashed mkdir shown in Table 3.1 is included in this language.
In general, we play around with different sizes of symbolic arguments until we
reach a minimum size and number of arguments that achieve high line coverage.
This is indicated by the loop from the output of klee to symbolic arguments in
Figure 3.1. With the GNU Coreutils library, we already have an idea of what inputs
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arg00

h sequence(h repeat n(h ch(‘-’), 2), h ch(‘c’), NULL)

arg01

h ch range(0, 127)

arg02

h not ch(‘-’)

Table 3.4: Parser generated from running mkdir with a variable number of symbolic
arguments, specifically letting there be 0 to 3 symbolic arguments of up to 3 characters. This differs from Table 3.3, which set each of its three symbolic arguments
to fixed sizes of 2, 1 and 1.

trigger the vulnerability. In addition, the experiments in [9] found a framework of
setting symbolic arguments to capture most behavior of the Coreutils applications,
specifically setting 3 symbolic arguments, one long and two short as well as a
symbolic file, stdin and stdout. One of klee’s limitations is that it seeks to find
an input that triggers an error at the line, but not all such input. Different sizes
and numbers of symbolic arguments can trigger the same error. Thus, even after
catching an error and generating a set of constraints, as we did with mkdir, we can
find other inputs that trigger the error with different sizes of symbolic arguments.
klee --optimize --libc=uclibc --posix-runtime ./mkdir.bc
--sym-args 0 3 3
The --sym-args option says to create from 0 to 3 symbolic arguments of up to
3 characters. The difference between this and our first call is before we had fixed 3
arguments of size up to 2, 1 and 1. Now, we have 0 to 3 arguments of size up to 3.
Our tool outputs the parsers in Table 3.4, again with ASCII values substituted for
readability.
The only difference in the constraints between this allocation of symbolic arguments is in the 0th argument. Allocating 3 instead of 1 character for the 1st
and 2nd symbolic argument did not change its constraints, so we assume that the
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current constraints hold for larger symbolic inputs. The 0th symbolic argument
constraints changed from -Z to --c. Upon further inspection, the two different
arguments denote the same command line option.
A symbolic argument of up to 3 characters should have also contained the
2 character input that triggered the error. However, once klee discovered a 3
character input (--c) that triggered the error, it did not describe different inputs
that lead to the same line. klee’s purpose is detecting the error and producing
one input that triggers the error. However, several different types of inputs may
trigger the same error. Testing different sizes of symbolic input to observe different
constraints is still a manual process, but this can be automated. This multiplies the
run time of the constraint generating process with multiple runs and taking the
union of the constraints of errors. This is indicated by the arrow that goes from the
program output back to adjusting symbolic arguments to see if different sizes of
arguments trigger the same or different errors in Figure 3.1.
The constraints aren’t perfect. Due to the nature of symbolic execution, the
halting problem, an undecidable problem, is embedded in ensuring that every path
is explored. We cannot prove or ensure every vulnerability is detected, so klee may
encounter false negatives. We are unable to consistently discover all vulnerabilities
in programs with klee, so we focus our discussion on defining parsers for detected
vulnerabilities. Even then, klee constraints miss inputs that trigger the detected
error the constraints are meant to capture. The symbolic execution engine does
not generate complete constraints describing all input that trigger the error. For
example in mkdir, the constraint of the 2nd argument not being ‘-’ is still part of the
language that crashes the program. This is not so much a false negative because it
successfully found an error, but its constraints did not describe all inputs that led to
it. The flip side of errors are false positives. We detect false positives by replaying
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the inputs that triggered the generated error with klee-replay and verifying that
the program crashed or otherwise failed.
The issue we address manually involves the true positives detected by klee. We
want to capture all the input that trigger these errors. We begin the iterative process
of running test cases by hand. Strings inside the grammar should crash the program
or trigger the detectable vulnerability and strings outside the grammar should be
correctly processed by the program. Informed by the constraints and knowledge
of expected program behavior, we adjust the grammar and parser accordingly.
Ideally, we also would like to construct parsers for false negatives, as in errors
undetected by klee, but klee does not give us any leads in that process. If we know
of some vulnerability that is not being detected, we can add an assert statement and
see if klee reports it as an assert error when running it on the updated program.
We operate on the assert error constraints the same way as any other error.
We similarly repeat the experiment for the other programs with bugs in GNU
Coreutils and report the outputted parsers in Table 3.5. Sometimes the order isn’t
as sensitive for different arguments and swapping them around will still cause
the program to crash. For mknod, you can swap arg00 and arg01. Because klee
focuses on finding one input that triggers the bug, this swap is not reflected in the
constraints and thus not in our automatically generated parser. The realization
came from comparing the known input that triggered the error and the outputted
grammar. This ability to swap two parameters will be represented by running
arg00 and arg01 with both parser orders.
The parsers aren’t complete in describing all input that trigger the errors because
of the constraint generator of the tool klee. The intent of klee is not to generate
constraints for every type of input that trigger the vulnerability, which would be
ideal for our tool to then analyze. Because of this, the constraints are neither
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arg00

[h sequence(h repeat n(h ch(‘-’), 2),
h ch(‘c’), NULL); h sequence(h ch(‘-’),
h ch(‘Z’), NULL)]

arg01

h ch range(0, 127)

arg02

h ch range(0, 127)

arg00

[h sequence(h repeat n(h ch(‘-’), 2),
h ch(‘c’), NULL); h sequence(h ch(‘-’),
h ch(‘Z’), NULL)]

arg01

h ch range(0, 127)

arg02

h ch range(0, 127)

arg03

h ch(‘p’)

arg00

h sequence(h ch(‘-’), h ch(‘c’), NULL)

stdin

h sequence( h ch(‘M’), h ch(‘D’), h ch(‘5’),
h ch(‘ ’), h ch(‘(’), NULL)

arg00

[h sequence(h repeat n(h ch(‘-’), 2),
h ch(‘f), NULL), h sequence(h ch(‘-’),
h ch(‘f), NULL),]

arg01

h sequence(h ch(‘%’), h ch range(1, 127))

arg02

h ch range(1, 127)

mknod

md5sum

seq

Table 3.5: Parsers outputted by other runs on GNU Coreutils programs. If the
parser is stored in a list, it signifies a union of these parsers.
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comprehensive nor entirely accurate. We limit the false positives that affect the
accuracy by replaying an input solved from the constraints, but that doesn’t reflect
all inputs in the constraints are not false positives. False positives may be due to
bugs in klee or nondeterminism of the program. The lack of comprehensiveness is
due to the fact that klee is more concerned that it detected an error than detecting all
such formats that trigger the error. However, examples that trigger the same error
usually follow a similar pattern. We can generalize the constraints for symbolic
arguments restricted to 3 characters to more characters. Also, the constraints
operate on a character by character basis, but this does not model many real world
applications. We discuss limitations further in Chapter 4.
The outputted C file allows for easy customization of the outputted parsers to
accommodate these errors. For example, with seq, we observe that the format
option (-f or --f) throws the bug and the second parameter just needs to be a valid
format string. If it isn’t, the seq parser will throw a syntax error anyways. Then,
we can rerun klee on seq, fixing the second symbolic input, with
klee --optimize --libc=uclibc --posix-runtime ./seq.bc
--sym-arg 3 %0 --sym-arg 2
We also run examples by hand. From the initial run of klee, we discover the error
arose in the format option, so the first argument is fixed to -f or --f. The second
parameter must consist of %, followed the a valid formatting sequence. Many
improperly formatted arguments are detected by seq’s own parser like invalid
floating point arguments, so to surpass their parser and crash the program, the
input needs to be valid floating points. With these messages, we determine that
the 1st argument should be a floating point format, and the 2nd argument should
be a floating point. We construct the the parser by hand accordingly, as shown
in Table 3.6. We use a few less intuitively named Hammer invocations, which are
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described in Table 1.2.

arg00

[h sequence(h repeat n(h ch(‘-’), 2), h ch(‘f), NULL),
h sequence(h ch(‘-’), h ch(‘f), NULL),]

arg01

h
h
h
h
h

sequence(h ch(‘%’),
optional(h choice(h ch(‘+’), h ch(‘-’), NULL)),
optional(h sequence(h many(h ch range(’0’, ’9’)),
ch(’.’), NULL)),
many1(h ch range(’0’, ’9’)), NULL)

arg02

h
h
h
h

sequence(h optional(h choice(h ch(‘+’), h ch(‘-’), NULL)),
optional(h sequence(h many(h ch range(’0’, ’9’)),
ch(’.’), NULL)),
many1(h ch range(’0’, ’9’)), NULL)

Table 3.6: Modified parser for seq. seq prints a sequence of numbers from first
to last, with first defaulting to 1. With knowledge of seq’s being triggered by the
format option (-f), we implemented by hand arg01 and arg02 that would bypass
seq’s parser for valid formats and crash the program.

Our tool’s output from parsing klee’s constraints gave us the outline of what is
considered invalid input, but klee’s constraints aren’t powerful enough to describe
all invalid input. Our tool successfully generates grammars and parsers from
the constraints specified, but manual intervention is still required to achieve a
more complete grammar. Due to limitations in computability, depending on the
complexity of a language, it may be theoretically impossible to prove that the
grammar we output is equal to the grammar of all inputs that do not trigger a
vulnerability.
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Section 3.2

Busybox 1.10.2
We similarly apply our parser generating tool to errors detected in Busybox 1.10.2
again on the same 64-bit Ubuntu Desktop. The Busybox library provides a smaller
version of common UNIX utilities, including programs in the Coreutils library [1].
Cadar et. al also applied klee to find bugs in this library [9], and although not
explicitly stated, we assume they ran the programs on a 32-bit machine like for
Coreutils. Again, we were only able to reproduce a subset of these errors and even
fewer with running klee within a max time cutoff of 60 minutes. The programs of
Busybox come with a much less exhaustive set of tests, and that is indicated in the
larger number of errors that klee finds per program. This introduced the need to
run our tool on each of the constraints generated by the errors and take the union
across all of them. We show parsers for 3 programs in Busybox in Table 3.7.
We observe how several different inputs trigger errors on different lines in the
program for install with a single symbolic argument. We take the union of all of
the parsers generated by the various constraints in arg00. We also take the union
between the two parsers listed in separate rows for install.
Upon expanding the number of symbolic arguments, we observe in top that
the same characters, or some combination of them, trigger the error. In particular,
a permutation of characters with ASCII values 0, 9, 10, 98, 100 and 110 for any
number of symbolic arguments will trigger the error.
The constraints for hexdump combined to form any possible input. Running
hexdump confirmed this behavior. However, hexdump behaves as expected if called
on an existing file. This language cannot be expressed because klee does not have
a concept of what files exist in the system.
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arg00

[h sequence(h repeat n(h ch(‘-’), 2),
h ch(‘m’), NULL);
h sequence(h repeat n(h ch(‘-’), 2),
h ch(‘g’), NULL);
h sequence(h ch(‘-’), h ch(‘g’), h ch range(0,
127), NULL)]

arg00

h ch range(0, 127)

arg01

h sequence(h repeat n(h not ch(‘-’), 2),
h not ch(‘d’), NULL)

arg00

h sequence(h ch(‘-’), h ch(‘d’), NULL)

arg01

h ch(0)

top

arg00,
arg01,
arg02,
...

h many(h choice(h ch(0), h ch(9), h ch(32),
h ch(‘b’), h ch(‘d’), h ch(‘n’), NULL))

hexdump

arg00

h ch range(0, 127)

install

install

install

Table 3.7: Parsers outputted by runs on Busybox programs. If the parser is stored
in a list, it signifies a union of these parsers.

We also looked at the most recent version of busybox, version 1.31.1 to see
what errors still exist in these programs. klee only detected errors in hexdump, but
upon replaying the input returned by the solver of these detected error-triggering
constraints, we found them to be false positives. Although our tool was able to
generate a parser for these constraints, we do not believe the constraints capture an
error in the program. With more time, we would test our tool on other programs
in the most recent busybox version.
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Section 3.3

Generating Grammars from Parsers
We demonstrate another application for this tool with a simple example that serves
as a proof of concept. Given a program that parses an input, we want to output
the grammar for the input in the form of a parser combinator. The difference lies in
the fact we do not want to protect against vulnerabilities, but instead capture the
format of the input the program expects. There are currently limitations with using
our tool to do this, especially regarding the complicated constraints generated by
external function calls like is alpha.
We wrote a function that parses a California license number to validate its
format, specifically that it is 8 characters long, the first character is a letter, and the
last 7 characters are digits between 0 and 9. The function consists of a series of
nested if -statements that check that each character falls within the specified range,
as shown in Figure 3.2. We insert an assert(0) statement in the inside of these
if -statements to force klee to detect an error in this path. klee detects assert errors,
among other errors, and outputs a set of constraints that lead to the error. Our tool
parses these constraints and constructs a parser for these known invalid inputs. By
taking a presumably correct parser, and making its success an error, our tool will
generate a grammar for a successful input. Running klee generates the constraints
that lead to the assert statement, which we then parse to construct the grammar.
If the program itself had a bug that klee detected, klee generates constraints for
both the bug and the assert error. We can distinguish the two by checking which
constraints had type assert error or what line number the error is thrown, both of
which klee provides for every error.
The parser outputs a clean representation of the grammar:
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Figure 3.2: Sample CA license plate parser to generate grammar
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

if ’a’ <= num[0] && num[0] <= ’z’) {
if (’0’ <= num[1] && num[1] <= ’9’) {
if (’0’ <= num[2] && num[1] <= ’9’) {
...
if (’0’ <= num[7] && num[1] <= ’9’) {
if (num[8] == ’\0’) {
printf("Valid input!\n");
assert(0);
}
}
...

h sequence(h ch range(‘a’, ‘z’), h repeat n(h ch range(‘0’, ‘9’),
7), h ch(0), NULL)
The technique of inserting an assert statement in a parser to extract the grammar
can be applied to other applications. We can also fine tune our tool’s constraint
parser to be able to replicate more advanced grammars. As mentioned in the
Related Work section, there exists prior work in synthesizing grammars from parser
programs [16, 18].

Section 3.4

Contributions
We applied a symbolic execution tool, generally used for exhaustive testing, to
generate grammars for LangSec. The goal of the grammar is to protect against
detected vulnerabilities rather than capture the intent of the developers when
writing the program. It operates on any program, not just parsers. Our tool begins
constructing the grammar without any knowledge of concrete inputs, which none
of the Related Work attempts.
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We expanded the functionality of klee. While klee provides one example of
an input that triggers the vulnerability, we construct a grammar for a set of inputs
captured by the constraints and adjust the set with manual intervention. We output
a parser implementation of the grammar, which can be prepended to the program
to defend against the vulnerabilities detected by klee.
The parser file generated is easy to read and implemented in the Hammer parser
combinator library. Because it is outputted in a compilable C file, it is also easy to
adapt and customize with knowledge of the program or known counterexamples
to the grammar. Recall that the outputted parser represents invalid input. When
prepended to the program, it rejects input that it parses correctly, and allows input
that it failed to parse through to the rest of the program.
We also showed that we can apply this to programs that validate input, with
assert statements, to reconstruct the grammar. This is not to protect against vulnerabilities but to define the format of accepted input.
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Section 4.1

Current Limitations
We first begin by considering the limitations of our tool in combination with klee
and then discuss how they may be addressed.
Our tool currently operates on inputs as strings, treating each element in the
symbolic array as a separate character. Our tool can be extended to integers with
additional case analysis in our parsing of the constraint AST to invoke Hammer’s
h int and h int range. We currently treat integers with each digit as a character.
Although the parsers we have generated cover the constraints that lead to
the error, they are not comprehensive in parsing all strings that lead to the error.
Generating more comprehensive parsers requires an iterative process of testing
examples and counterexamples in the grammar and adjusting it accordingly. Based
on results of the papers mentioned in the Related Work, this adaptive process of
generating grammars can be automated for lower level languages [3,6]. For regular
expressions and context free languages, a grammar can be formed and adjusted
with a series of examples and counterexamples. We would alter our already formed
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grammar with this process.
In addition, different sizes and numbers of symbolic inputs lead to different
constraints, so a comprehensive grammar requires integrating the constraints of
variable symbolic argument options. The user can input different symbolic arguments and take the union of all the parsers generated. This multiplies the run time
by the number of different configurations of symbolic arguments.
Although symbolic execution intelligently traverses every path an input can
take, any exhaustive search of all possible paths in a program will explode in
memory and time. Optimizations can be applied, but this reduces the practicality
for larger scale inputs and programs. However, the issue of path explosion is more
a theoretical limit than an engineering problem.
We treat each symbolic input separately and assume that their constraints do not
influence each other. For example, we assume there is no constraint saying that the
first character in each symbolic argument is the same. Although this assumption is
safe for the programs we tested our tool on, it may not be the case for an arbitrary
program.
We discuss how some of these limitations can be addressed in future work.

Section 4.2

Modifying klee
The purpose of klee is to automatically perform tests that achieve high coverage
on a diverse set of programs. While sufficient in detecting errors, klee only cares
about discovering one input that triggers the error rather than the whole set of
inputs. Thus, constraints are not comprehensive of possible input that may trigger
the vulnerability. In order to capture a larger set of invalid input, a natural next
step would be to modify the symbolic execution of klee.
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Many tools are built on top of klee to achieve different purposes [10, 20, 24].
Ramos et. al configured klee to check the equivalence between two arbitrary klee
functions [24]. Corin et. al extended the klee symbolic execution engine with a
tainting mechanism to track information flows of data [10]. klee is a very powerful
tool that we appended to by interpreting its constraints to generate a parser, but
the method of generating these constraints should also be modified to best fit our
needs. Future steps could modify klee to generate constraints which capture more
inputs that lead to the given line rather than a subset of such inputs.
4.2.1. Directed Symbolic Execution
When we look at a program with a known vulnerability to establish a parser
defending against this vulnerability, we usually know which exact line it occurs.
Symbolic execution seeks to perform an exhaustive search of all possible paths, but
in our use case, we only wish to explore the path that leads to the specified line. Ma
et. al modified klee’s search strategy to solve the problem of finding the shortest
path to a certain line in the code [21]. This is relevant for programs with known
buggy lines, so the symbolic execution can be directed to those specific lines. The
vulnerable constraints can be more quickly and reasonably generated.
It will also be useful to tag areas of interest rather treat every line of code
coverage equally. Future work in directed symbolic execution could weigh certain
paths or lines above others in exploration priority. Bugs in lines of code that are
not reached as often can be discovered with the ability to highlight these lines.
In addition, it is infeasible to traverse every path of large programs, so directed
symbolic execution narrows the focus.
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4.2.2. Expanding System Environments
klee just models the file system, but other environments such as sockets or multithreading are not supported. However, the inability to model the system environment is a known handicap for symbolic execution.

Section 4.3

Further Automation
After our tool generates a preliminary grammar, the grammar needs to be updated
based on the knowledge of counterexamples. We can base future automation of
synthesizing a grammar with examples and counterexamples on [3] and [6], which
respectively tackle regular expressions and context free grammars. They rely on
the ability to generate examples and counterexamples for a given grammar and
check if these inputs are actually an example or counterexample of our conjectured
grammar. The conjectured grammar is adapted if it doesn’t contain an example, or
if it fails to exclude a counterexample.

Section 4.4

Other Dynamic Analysis
The methods presented in [18] and [16] infer grammars from executing programs
on a collection of given inputs. They work on programs that are intended to parse
input to construct this grammar. Our task is distinct but related to theirs because
we construct a grammar that protects against vulnerabilities. Perhaps a similar
dynamic tainting process of the data can be applied to generate constraints. We
can apply the tactics of memory tracing to a program whose intent is not to parse
the input but still accesses and manipulates the input in some way.
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These papers generate the grammar in Backus Normal Form. Another direction
of automatically generating parsers is to take a grammar written in BNF and output
a parser implementation of the grammar.

Section 4.5

Optimize Grammar
The current representation of the grammar in Hammer invocations is not the most
readable or optimal form. For example, a sequence of characters can be converted
to a token or a string. Also, after the union operation, the grammar can be further
optimized and simply expressed.

Section 4.6

Testing Grammar
We currently test the grammar by checking whether known inputs that trigger the
error and other inputs in similar formats are caught by the grammar, which is not
a complete way of assessing the grammar. We can test the grammar with random
fuzzing which is not a formal proof but has been a successful testing technique.
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Conclusion
The ultimate goal is to take a program as input and output a parser that protects
against all vulnerabilities, not only known vulnerabilities. This will require the
ability to detect the existence of any vulnerability, which given complex enough
languages is theoretically impossible. We focus on generating a parser that protects
against detectable vulnerabilities.
Our tool is able to automatically generate a parser combinator that rejects buggy
inputs, as defined by constraints that lead to an error. Due to incompleteness in the
constraints and limitations of symbolic execution in general, getting a satisfactory
parser still requires manual intervention. For some programs, this intervention is
nontrivial. With further efforts detailed in the Future Work chapter, the process can
be further automated.
Using symbolic execution to generate grammars shows promise. Symbolic
execution details what path is traversed to get to the vulnerable line, and the union
of all such paths should inform what is considered valid or invalid input. The tool
can also be used in conjunction with klee to get an idea of the types of inputs that
trigger the error, which is helpful in the debugging process.
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